Defining Mental Disorder: Jerome Wakefield and His Critics

watch Contents Introduction HDA: A Presentation Worries about HDA The Content of the Volume Acknowledgments References Wakefield Critiques: Introductory Comments I. On Conceptual Analysis 1. DSM in the Light of HDA (and Conversely) Introduction I. Wakefield, an Early Advocate of the DSM-III II. DSM and the Concept of Mental Disorder III. HDA in the Light of DSM Concluding Remarks Appendix Notes References 2. From Ribot and Dupré to Spitzer and RDoC: Does the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis Possess Historical Explanatory Power? Reply to Steeves Demazeux Demazeux versus Wakefield on How to Think about the 1975 Spitzer and Wilson Definition Demazeux versus Wakefield on How to Think about the Role of “Organismic Dysfunction” in the 1978 Spitzer and Endicott Definition and the DSM-III (1980) Definition Understanding the Introduction of “Organismic Dysfunction” into the 1978 and 1980 Definitions as an Attempt to Eliminate Counterexamples to the 1975 Definition Relation of DSM Criteria to the Dysfunction Requirement Is RDoC a Threat to the HDA? The Historicist Challenge: Three Proposed Counterexamples to the HDA What about Foucault? References 3. Facts, Facts, Facts: HD Analysis Goes Factual I. HD Analysis II. Conceptual Analysis as a Form of Empirical Psychology III. Evolutionary Psychology to the Rescue Conclusion Notes References 4. Do the Empirical Facts Support the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis? Reply to Luc Faucher Do the Colombo et al. and Harland et al. Studies Challenge the HDA? Conduct Disorder Studies Replies to Murphy and Woolfolk’s and Houts’s Critiques of the Conduct Disorder Studies Epistemology References 5. Against the Disorder/Nondisorder Dichotomy Introduction I. HDA as a Conceptual Analysis: Characteristics and Goals II. HDA as a Conceptual Analysis: Which of Two Flavors? III. Boundaries IV. Relation with (Medical) Practice Conclusion Notes References 6. Do Clinicians Understand the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder? Reply to Leen De Vreese De Vreese’s Methodological Objections to Conceptual Analysis Why Haslam’s (2002) “Kinds of Kinds” Fails to Support De Vreese’s Disorder Pluralism The Example of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) References 7. Doing without “Disorder” in the Study of Psychopathology I. Contributions II. Unneeded Grounds III. Evolutionary Foundations? IV. An Alternative Picture Notes References 8. Quinian Qualms, or Does Psychiatry Really Need the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis? Reply to Harold Kincaid Psychiatry’s Need for a Conceptual Analysis of Mental Disorder Kincaid’s Analogy between “Cancer” and “Mental Disorder” Whose Intuitions Is the HDA Trying to Explain? Kincaid’s Approach to Mental Disorder Are There Naturally Selected Disorders? Disorders as Disproportionate Responses Disorders as Mismatches between Organism and Environment Disorders as Extremes on Dimensions References II. The Demarcation Problem 9. Psychiatric Disorders and the Imperfect Community: A Nominalist HDA I. The Concept of Psychiatric Disorder: Why Wakefield Matters II. The Imperfect Community Model III. The Causal Network Approach IV. Identifying Disorders in the Imperfect Community Acknowledgments Notes References 10. Can a Nonessentialist Neo-Empiricist Analysis of Mental Disorder Replace the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis? Reply to Peter Zachar Essentialism versus Neo-Empiricism Zachar’s “Decline-of-Functioning” Account of Disorder “Imperfect Community”: Zachar on the History and Heterogeneity of Psychiatric Disorders Zachar on the Causal Network Approach to Intelligence Borsboom on the Causal Network Approach to Psychopathology References III. The Dysfunction Component 11. Is the Dysfunction Component of the “Harmful Dysfunction Analysis” Stipulative? Introduction I. What Kind of Definition Does the HDA Aim at? II. Is the Definition of “Mental Disorder” as Dysfunction Descriptive or Stipulative? III. Is the Definition of “Dysfunction” as an Evolutionary Concept Explication or Stipulation? Conclusion Note References 12. Is the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis Descriptive or Stipulative, and Is the HDA or BST the Better Naturalist Account of Dysfunction? Reply to Maël Lemoine The Conceptual Analysis (Strictly Speaking) of “Medical Disorder” Modest Black-Box Essentialism Do the HDA and BST Offer Competing Theories of “Function”? Boorse on the Explanatory Power of the BST Essence Indeterminacy and the Limits of Stipulation Is the BST a Better Naturalist Account of Dysfunction Than the HDA? The HDA versus the BST on Setting the Mean and Range of Normal Functioning The Pandemic Disease Objection to a Statistical Criterion for Dysfunction Reference Classes and the Myth of a Statistical Theory of Dysfunction Conclusion References 13. Function and Dysfunction Introduction I. The Components of Wakefield’s View II. The Concept of Function Notes References 14. Can Causal Role Functions Yield Objective Judgments of Medical Dysfunction and Replace the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis’s Evolutionary Component? Reply to Dominic Murphy The Ubiquity of CR Functions and the Reality of SE Functions One Doubt about CR Functions The Problem of the Objectivity of Biological Dysfunction Is the HDA Too Revisionist? Reply to Kingma’s Genetic Linkage Argument for the HDA Being Strongly Revisionist Does the HDA Cohere with Relevant Scientific Practice? Cummins on Interest Relativity and the Function of the Sound of the Heart Why Call SE Functions “Functions”? Can SE Functions Be Understood as Fixed-Interest CR Functions? Can CR Functions Account for the Objectivity of Dysfunction? Bock and von Wahlert and the Biological Origins of the CR- versus SE-Functions Distinction Amundson and Lauder’s Defense of CR Functions Can CR Functions Be Saved from the Promiscuity Objection? Biological Design as the Target Explanandum for Function Attributions Peter Godfrey-Smith (1993) versus the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis: Reply to the Editors Conclusion References 15. Do the Works of Carl Craver or Marcel Weber Explain How Causal Role Functions Can Provide Objective Medical Judgments of Dysfunction? Supplementary Reply to Dominic Murphy Carl Craver’s (2007) Analysis of Mechanistic Explanation Marcel Weber’s Coherence Theory of Natural Function Conclusion References 16. The Developmental Plasticity Challenge to Wakefield’s View Introduction I. What Are Functions? What Are Dysfunctions? II. The Evolved Mismatch Criticism of the HD Analysis III. Developmental Mismatches and Dysfunctional Mechanisms Acknowledgments References 17. Does Developmental Plasticity Pose a Challenge to the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis? Reply to Justin Garson First Version: The Evolutionary Mismatch Objection Second Version: The Modal Mismatch Argument The Theoretical Argument: Are There Bona Fide Mental Disorders That Would Continue to Be Classified as Mental Disorders No Matter What We Found Out about Their Etiology? The Empirical Argument: When Bona Fide Mental Disorders Are Discovered to Be Mismatches and Not Dysfunctions, Are They Still Considered Mental Disorders? Third Mismatch Version: The Developmental Mismatch Objection Other Authors Cited by Garson References 18. Biological Function Hierarchies and Indeterminacy of Dysfunction: Supplementary Reply to Justin Garson References 19. Harmful Dysfunction and the Science of Salience: Adaptations and Adaptationism I. Mechanisms of Belief Fixation? II. Delusion and the DSM III. Mechanisms and Salience IV. Dopamine and Delusion Conclusion References 20. Are Cognitive Neuroscience and the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis Competitors or Allies? Reply to Philip Gerrans Mechanical-Causal and Biological-Design Analyses as Complementary in a Theory of Disorder Neuroscience versus Evolutionary Psychology in the Quest for Dysfunctions Neuroscience, Strong Adaptationism, and the HDA Neuroscience, Belief Fixation, and the HDA Neuroscience, the DSM-5, and the HDA References 21. Autistic Spectrum, Normal Variation, and Harmful Dysfunction Introduction I. Psychological Theories of Autism: What Is Dysfunctional, and in What Sense? II. Normality and High-Functioning Autism III. Harm without Values Conclusion Notes References 22. Do the Challenges of Autism and Neurodiversity Pose an Objection to the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis? Reply to Denis Forest Essentialist Confusions in the Extension of Diagnostic Categories Varieties of Health Is Autism a Trade-off for Savant Talents and Thus a Normal Variation? Neurodiversity versus Neurotypicality Does the Harm Criterion Need to Be More Factual? References 23. Naturalism and Dysfunction Introduction: Disorder and Naturalism I. Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Model II. What Kind of Reductionist Naturalism? III. A Wittgensteinian Objection to Millikan’s Project IV. Biological Function and Illness, Disease, and Disorder V. A Quinian Response? Conclusion Acknowledgments References 24. Is Indeterminacy of Biological Function an Objection to the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis? Reply to Tim Thornton References IV. The Harmful Component 25. Harmless Dysfunctions and the Problem of Normal Variation I. The Downsides of a Hybrid Concept of (Mental) Disorder II. Fused Toes and Albinism III. Normal Variation and Harmless Dysfunctions Notes References 26. Can the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis Distinguish Problematic Normal Variation from Disorder? Reply to Andreas De Block and Jonathan Sholl Dyslexia, Homosexuality, and Social versus Individual Values Does the DSM’s “Clinical Significance Criterion” Require Individual-Perceived Harm? What If We Discovered That a Paradigmatic Disorder Was Naturally Selected? Past Examples of Harmless Dysfunctions That Are Not Considered Disorders New Examples of Clear Cases of Harmless Dysfunctions Not Considered Disorders Why Do We Classify Morning Sickness as Normal and Hyperemesis Gravidarum as a Disorder? The Example of Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder Harm Is Not the Only Dimension in Judging Disorder References 27. On Harm I. Wakefield’s Struggle with an Account of Harm II. Starting Again—How to Assess Harm? III. Making Progress IV. Loose Ends Notes References 28. Must Social Values Play a Role in the Harm Component of the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis? Reply to Rachel Cooper Mea Culpa! Why Social Values? Anorexia Island Three Methods for Challenging Initial Harm Judgments Cooper on the Concept of Mental Disorder DSM-5 and Harm References 29. Are There Naturally Selected Disorders? Supplementary Reply to Rachel Cooper Reply to Peter Schwartz’s Proposed Counterexamples to the HDA’s Dysfunction Requirement References Contributors Index